Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 34 | Number 1

Article 17

2007

A ROLE FOR DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES IN
THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
Robert H. Tembeckjian
New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Tembeckjian, A ROLE FOR DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES IN THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS, 34 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 501 (2007).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol34/iss1/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

A ROLE FOR DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES IN THE JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROCESS
Cover Page Footnote

Robert H. Tembeckjian is Administrator and Counsel to the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct.

This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol34/iss1/17

\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ119.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

4-APR-07

11:06

A ROLE FOR DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES IN
THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
Robert H. Tembeckjian*
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have a judicial disciplinary entity responsible for investigating complaints of ethical
wrongdoing by judges and, where appropriate, disciplining or recommending discipline for those judges found to have engaged in
misconduct.1 These jurisdictions also have grievance committees
to deal with complaints against lawyers.2
Whether a state chooses its judges by appointment, election, or
some combination of the two, is there an appropriate role for a
judicial disciplinary commission or an attorney grievance committee in the selection or evaluation process of judicial candidates? If
so, how limited or expansive should that role be?
The answers to these questions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. While all the states have disciplinary systems, there is no uniformity as to whether or to what degree the disciplinary entity may
participate in the selection or evaluation process.3
In Michigan and Mississippi, for example, the Judicial Tenure
Commission and the Commission on Judicial Performance, respectively, play no role in the selection process.4 In Indiana and the
District of Columbia, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications
* Robert H. Tembeckjian is Administrator and Counsel to the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct.
1. See David Cleveland & Jason Masimore, The Ermine and Woolsack: Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Judges, Attorney-Magistrates and Other Judicial Figures,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1037, 1043 (2001) (noting that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have established judicial discipline organizations in order to “review
and supervise judicial behavior and reprimand errant judges”).
2. For a list of these grievance committees, see ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DIRECTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/regulation/scpd/disciplinary.html.
3. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2004), www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.
pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (providing data summarizing each jurisdiction’s method
of judicial selection); see also infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (indicating that in
states such as Michigan and Mississippi, disciplinary committees are not involved in
the selection process, while in jurisdictions such as Indiana and the District of Columbia, disciplinary committees play an active role in judicial selection).
4. See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30 (providing for the creation of Michigan’s Judicial Tenure Commission); MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 177A (providing for the creation of
Mississippi’s Commission on Judicial Performance); see also William B. Murphy &
Joseph F. Regnier, Malpractice/Attorney Discipline: The Role and Function of the Ju-
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and the Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, respectively, are integral parts of the selection process and in fact double
as the judicial nominating entity for some or all judicial vacancies.5
For example, for vacancies on the Indiana Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals, the commission nominates three candidates to the governor, who must choose from among those nominees.6
In New York, the Commission on Judicial Conduct plays a limited role, required by statute under certain circumstances to reveal
information pertaining to candidates under consideration for appointment by the governor or being rated by such entities as a bar
association evaluation committee for election or appointment.7
(Records of attorney grievance committees may be released for
“good cause” on order of the Appellate Division.8) This approach
appears to be rooted in the notion that disciplinary entities, while
not necessarily oriented toward identifying those best or most qualified for judicial office, are likely to have useful information as to
candidates that may be ill-suited for the bench.
The overwhelming majority of New York State’s 3,400 judges are
elected to office.9 A relative few—judges of the Court of Appeals,
the Court of Claims, and the New York City Criminal and Family
Courts, for example—are appointed.10
One of the concerns often expressed regarding a shift from a
predominantly elective system to an appointive system is the effective disenfranchisement of the electorate that would result.11 One
of the common rebuttals to this concern is the example of the feddicial Tenure Commission, 75 MICH. B. J. 1042, 1042-44 (1996) (describing the functions of the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission).
5. See IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (providing for the establishment of Indiana’s
Commission on Judicial Qualifications); District of Columbia Self-Government and
Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 433(c), 87 Stat. 774, 796
(1973) (describing the role of a Judicial Tenure Commission in the District of Columbia in evaluating candidacy for judicial reappointment).
6. IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 9-10.
7. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 45 (McKinney 2006).
8. Id. § 90(10).
9. See Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 800 (2004); see also
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, NEW YORK JUDICIAL SELECTION: AN INTRODUCTION,
http://www.ajs.org/js/NY.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
10. For an illustration of how judges are selected in New York, see AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, NEW YORK JUDICIAL SELECTION: CURRENT METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION,
http://www.ajs.org/js/NY_methods.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006)
[hereinafter NEW YORK METHODS].
11. See, e.g., Seth Anderson, Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection
in the States, 67 ALB. L. REV. 793, 796 (2004) (suggesting voter disenfranchisement as
an explanation for the decline in voter support for appointive judicial systems).
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eral judiciary, which has never been elected and was purposefully
designed to be independent of the partisan political process.12
Without comment on whether an appointive system would be
superior or inferior to the electoral method, the New York experience in a predominantly electoral system suggests that in an appointive system, participation by the judicial or attorney
disciplinary entity can at least partially compensate for the lack of
direct voter participation, assuming—as is the case in New York—
that the system reposes the actual authority to nominate and/or
confirm in elected representatives of the body politic.13 Obviously,
no system, elective or appointive, is going to be perfect or please
every constituency. For any method to work, the public must have
justifiable faith in the reasonableness of the structure and the good
faith efforts of the participants in fulfilling their responsibilities.
Like most professional disciplinary entities, the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct (“the Commission”) operates
under a strict mandate of confidentiality in the investigative stage
of its work.14 (New York is in the minority of states—thirty-eight
to twelve—insofar as it requires proceedings to remain confidential
even when investigation is concluded and formal disciplinary
charges have been proferred against the respondent judge.15)
There is a natural tension in this process between legitimate
competing forces. The Commission must conduct its investigative
work vigorously yet discreetly.16 It must protect the confidentiality
of both respondents and complainants, while weighing a compelling responsibility to provide the public, directly or through its representatives, appropriate information bearing on the qualifications
and fitness of those running or being considered for judicial office.17 There is a legitimate argument to be made that the Commission is obliged to provide enlightening, useful, and credible
information to the appointing, nominating, or electing authority to
12. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273,
300 (2002).
13. Judicial nomination of the New York Court of Appeals and Appellate Division positions is done by a commission appointed by the governor. See N.Y. JUD.
LAW §§ 62-63. Selection of New York Supreme Court judges is done by partisan election. See NEW YORK METHODS, supra note 10.
14. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 44(3) & 45.
15. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, WHEN CONFIDENTIALITY CEASES, http://www.
ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/When%20confidentiality%20ceases.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
16. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 45.
17. See id. § 42; see also Nicholson v. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 409
N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1980).
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ensure that such entities make an informed decision on whom to
elevate to the bench. Should not a governor or the voting public
know, for example, that a particular candidate for judicial office
had been issued three or four private reprimands by an attorney or
judicial disciplinary body?
There is also tension as the Commission endeavors to protect the
integrity of the system from interference or manipulation by individuals inappropriately motivated by politics to manufacture complaints against their opponents in hopes of thwarting a favorable
rating for appointment or election. (While smoke does not always
mean fire, the appointing or electing authorities may not have
enough time to recognize and reject a misinformation campaign.)
Can we negotiate such tensions in the Commission that possesses
information useful to a nominator’s evaluation of a candidate’s credentials, without at the same time compromising the confidentiality
mandate that both protects the accused and the independence of
the Commission to do its work? Can the Commission freely make
a decision on the merits of a case today without necessarily being
influenced by the possibility that its decision may have an impact
on the retention prospects of the judge under scrutiny?
The mechanism devised by New York and some other states to
deal with these issues is the waiver of confidentiality.18 Section 45
of New York State’s Judiciary Law provides that, on a written
waiver of confidentiality by a judge, the Commission must disclose
certain information to those individuals or organizations named in
the waiver.19 For example, any formal public or private discipline
of the judge must be revealed,20 but frivolous or unsubstantiated
complaints would not be revealed.21
Thus, the Commission would release to any entity that is evaluating a candidate for nomination or election to the bench, pursuant
to a written waiver of confidentiality from that applicant, whatever
private or public disciplinary action there has been against that in18. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 45(1)
19. See id.
20. See Nichols v. Gamso, 35 N.Y.2d 35, 38 (1974).
When . . . charges or complaints are sustained and the determinations are
made public by the court with jurisdiction of the charges, it may be an abuse
of discretion, as a matter of public policy, absent compelling circumstances
affecting the public interest, not to make available to public scrutiny so much
of the record and proceedings as bear on the charges sustained.
Id.
21. See In re Mertens, 395 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that courts
“may apparently only release the portions of the record relating to charges which
have been sustained . . . ”).
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dividual.22 This helps protect the integrity of the appointment process by presenting information that by any standard would be
significant for an evaluator to consider, while at the same time protecting both the Commission’s files and the judicial candidate’s
reputation from unwarranted invasion or attack.23 The waiver of
confidentiality is not meant to, and should not, encourage the proverbial fishing expedition by anyone looking to obtain confidential
material that did not result in adverse action to the respondent.24
Even if the candidate were the subject of numerous unsubstantiated complaints, such information would not necessarily be probative of her credentials, could readily be misinterpreted, and should
not be disclosed.25 For example, any judge who has presided over
contested matrimonial and custody cases, which tend to be fiercely
and often bitterly litigated, will likely generate much criticism from
dissatisfied litigants. Yet the volume of complaints would more
likely reflect the intensely personal and unhappy nature of the
cases rather than the judge’s demeanor or ethical credentials.
So, if someone had been the subject of twenty or thirty complaints and none of them were found to be meritorious, the Commission would not reveal that information, even with a waiver of
confidentiality signed by the judge.26 But if the individual was the
subject of a confidential disciplinary letter of caution,27 or a public
22. See Nichols, 35 N.Y.2d at 38.
23. See Nicholson v. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 409 N.E.2d 818, 825 n.*
(N.Y. 1980) (“[The confidentiality of preliminary commission proceedings] serve[s]
the dual purpose of protecting the confidentiality of complainants and witnesses, thus,
ensuring the more effective functioning of the commission, and of protecting the
Judge under investigation from injury to reputation resulting from the exposure of
unjustified complaints.”); see also Landmark Comm., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
835 (1978) (“[T]he confidentiality . . . protects judges from the injury which might
result from publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints.”).
24. See, e.g., Nichols, 35 N.Y.2d at 39 (stating that confidential material related
only to charges actually sustained need be disclosed); Mertens, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 196
(citing the impermissibility of releasing confidential material relating to false
accusations).
25. See Nichols, 35 N.Y.2d at 39 (“[S]o much of the record and proceedings which
do not relate to the charges sustained need not be disclosed.”) (emphasis added).
26. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 45(1) (McKinney 2006) (providing that Commission proceedings are confidential except when an adverse determination has been made
against a judge by the Commission pursuant to § 44).
27. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 7000.1(m) (2006) (defining a “letter
of caution” as “written confidential comments, suggestions and recommendations . . .
issued by the commission to a judge at the conclusion of proceedings pursuant to a
formal written complaint, upon a finding that the judge’s misconduct is established”);
see also id. §7000.7(d) (providing that the Commission may issue a letter of caution
when “a determination other than admonition, censure, removal or retirement from
office is [deemed] appropriate”).
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determination of admonition, censure, or removal from office,28
that information would be revealed.29
Judiciary Law Section 45 also provides that, pursuant to a waiver
of confidentiality, the Commission must reveal to the governor any
pending complaint against the subject judge.30 The statute also
gives the Commission fifteen days to respond to such requests for
information.31 This allows for the opportunity to dismiss frivolous
complaints before the compliance period expires, providing a valuable hedge against a disreputable campaign to torpedo a nomination with innuendo. Imagine, for example, a judicial candidate’s
opponents orchestrating a bogus complaint-writing campaign just
as the nominator or evaluator is deciding whether to support or
oppose the candidate’s nomination or election. The candidate
would submit a waiver of confidentiality without necessarily knowing that such complaints had been generated. Were the Commission required to turn over such bogus complaints without an
opportunity to evaluate and dismiss them, the nominating process
would be inappropriately manipulated and seriously compromised.
With the statutory fifteen-day window, however, the Commission
can consider and, if warranted, dispose of new complaints without
having to disclose them to the nominating or evaluating authority,
even with a waiver of confidentiality in place.32
This fairly sophisticated structure did not spring full-blown from
the mind of some sage. Rather, it has evolved over the years as the
subject of legislative amendment, formal advisory opinions, and litigation. Over a thirty-year period, the Legislature, the courts, and
the Commission amassed experience in dealing with issues of judicial conduct, including good-faith attempts to pierce the confidentiality shield33 and bad-faith attempts to undermine a judge’s
retention prospects with frivolous complaints that were then made
public by the judge’s opponents.34
28. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 44(7).
29. Id. (“[T]he determination of the commission, its findings and conclusions and
the record of its proceedings shall be made public and shall be made available for
public inspection at the principal office of the commission and at the office of the
clerk of the court of appeals.”).
30. Id. § 45(2)(b).
31. Id. § 45(2)(c).
32. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 22, § 7000.3(b).
33. See, e.g., Stern v. Morgenthau, 465 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a
Grand Jury subpoena for confidential Commission records should be quashed).
34. See, e.g., In re Harrison, 611 S.E.2d 834, 835 (N.C. 2005) (reviewing a judge’s
allegations that a series of frivolous complaints had been filed against her before the
North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission).
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One category of information held by the Commission, arguably
of interest to the appointing or electing authority but not explicitly
covered among the material that must be disclosed pursuant to a
waiver, is the letter of dismissal and caution,35 as distinguished
from the aforementioned letter of caution,36 which must be revealed. Whereas a confidential letter of caution is issued to a judge
at the conclusion of a formal disciplinary proceeding in which the
judge’s misconduct is established, a confidential letter of dismissal
and caution is issued to the judge in lieu of a formal disciplinary
proceeding.37 Dismissal and caution letters generally serve an educational purpose and may advise a judge to adhere more carefully
to particular provisions of law or the Code of Judicial Conduct
which, on an isolated basis, the judge may have overlooked.
Should an appointing or evaluating authority be allowed to review such letters of dismissal and caution? Might the letters provide some useful point of reference or comparison with a judge
who never received one? Might the letters reveal positive information about the judge, such as openness to constructive commentary
and a capacity to improve? It is not unusual for letters of dismissal
and caution to note that the judge recognized a shortcoming and
already took corrective measures. Typically, an appointing or evaluating authority, such as a gubernatorial or legislative committee
or bar association, would appropriately assess the significance of
such letters. There is no evidence that a qualified judicial applicant
or candidate was ever wrongfully denied office or advancement because of the information contained in such a letter.38
The Commission’s position has always been that a judge is affirmatively obliged to reveal such a letter in response to a request
from such an authority, but the governing statute does not permit
the Commission itself to disclose it, even with a waiver from the
judge.39 Unfortunately, there have been times when candidates for
judicial appointment have failed to reveal such information, even
when directly asked by the appropriate authority.40
35. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 22 § 7000.1(l) .
36. Id. § 7000.1(m).
37. See id. §§ 7000.1(l)-(m).
38. See generally id. § 7000.4(a)(1).
39. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 45(1) (McKinney 2006).
40. In one reported case, a judge denied to the Governor’s Judicial Screening
Committee that he was under investigation by the Commission when in fact he knew
that he was, having recently appeared at the Commission to testify about the matter.
In re Collazo, 691 N.E.2d 1021, 1022 (N.Y. 1998). In at least one unreported situation,
the Commission became aware that a judge who had received letters of dismissal and
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To prevent against such manipulations, the Governor’s Judicial
Screening Committee in New York developed a protocol in 2003
by which it first asks the judicial candidate to request from the
Commission copies of any public disciplines and confidential cautionary letters previously issued to her, then asks the candidate to
disclose the Commission’s response. It is always the candidate’s
option to agree or decline to sign the waiver of confidentiality or
otherwise provide the appointing or evaluating authority with requested information.41 As a practical matter, it is highly unlikely
that anyone who declined such requests would be appointed or
rated qualified by a bar association,42 although in an elected system
such a candidate could prevail with the voters nonetheless.43
Nothing in the judicial appointment or election process, or the
procedures discussed here, should be confused with or viewed as a
substitute for the disciplinary process whereby an incumbent judge
could be formally disciplined, including removal from office.44 Ascending the bench and being reappointed or reelected is not
modeled on due process, as the disciplinary system is.45 No judicial
conduct commission should attempt to achieve the removal of a
judge for office by shortcut, through negative evaluations elicited
during either the appointive or elective re-ascension process, without resort to a due process notice and hearing procedure. The integrity of such a commission would be seriously compromised were
it to be reasonably perceived as so politically motivated and
manipulative.46
Due process of law can take a very long time. But it is one of the
essential elements and strengths of our legal and disciplinary system that must not be abridged, even where the best appointive or
elective system produces the occasional “bad apple.” Fortunately,
caution misleadingly described them as outright dismissals without providing the
nominating entity with hard copies.
41. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 45(2).
42. See Collazo, 691 N.E.2d at 1023 (noting that a judicial nominee’s failure to
return promptly a Senate Judiciary Committee’s request for waiver of his right to
confidentiality contributed to the determination of the nominee’s pattern of evasive
and deceitful behavior).
43. Michael Cardozo, Cardozo’s Reform Rx: Mending a Broken Bench, JUD. REP.,
Sept. 8, 2006, available at http://www.judicialreports.com/archives/2006/09/the_cardozo_rx_for_judicial_re_1.php.
44. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 44.
45. See N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 22
(2006), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/publications/2006%annual%20report.
nyscjc.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
46. See generally Mark Alcott, Op-Ed., Picking Judges on the Merits, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2006.
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the vast majority of judges are honorable, independent, and impartial and have nothing to fear from the conduct commission’s limited but important participation in the appointment and electoral
evaluation processes.47

47. See Cardozo, supra note 43 (explaining that although the judicial appointment
process in New York requires mending, “most judges are honest, hardworking, and
smart men and women”).
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